Text, files, media, and groups
The whitepaper describes end-to-end encryption for supported conversation content.
XecureCom is a Greenlyz messaging product in development. Its current public whitepaper describes end-to-end encryption, passwordless access, and a content-blind relay architecture.
Features and security properties may change before release.
The current XecureCom materials describe a server that forwards encrypted data while user devices create, hold, and use the private encryption keys.
The whitepaper describes end-to-end encryption for supported conversation content.
The design specifies FIDO2 and WebAuthn passkeys instead of reusable account passwords.
Users are intended to compare safety numbers when verifying an encrypted relationship.
The published design does not require a phone number as the primary account identifier.
The current whitepaper specifies X3DH for session establishment and the Double Ratchet for message-key evolution.
The design aims to limit exposure of earlier messages and support recovery after a key compromise, subject to the protocol state and a fresh ratchet step.
The published design includes safety-number verification and identity-key change warnings. These controls are intended to help users detect unexpected changes and verify a secure relationship through a separate trusted channel.
Users can compare a fingerprint through another trusted channel before treating a conversation as verified.
A changed identity key should be surfaced rather than silently accepted by the client.
These capabilities appear in the current Greenlyz-authored materials. Their final behavior and release timing have not been announced.
The design describes contact information encrypted on the client before server storage.
The published concept includes optional GPS and battery information sent to user-selected trusted contacts.
The whitepaper describes portable key material intended to remain under the user’s control.
The planned product is described for both desktop and mobile use; supported platforms are not yet final.
Malware or unauthorized access to an unlocked device can expose content after decryption.
Device locks, operating-system security, backups, and local handling remain important.
The design does not claim to conceal every communication pattern from a global observer.
The design acknowledges account information, public keys, approximate sizes, and delivery timing.
Read the public whitepaper for the current architecture, or contact Greenlyz with a product or security question.